Command, control and coordination

Responder organisations come together to form local resilience forums (LRFs) to facilitate cooperation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). Specifically, Category 1 responders, supported by Category 2 responders, as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Planning is done through an LRF. This should include awareness of business continuity.

The LRF planning process is assisted by the following products (available through ResilienceDirect).

• Strategic Policing Requirement.
• National Policing Requirement.
• National Resilience Planning Assumptions.
• National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) – the NSRA identifies and assesses the most serious risks facing the UK. The information is used by LRFs to develop a community risk register enabling the LRF to focus multi-agency work on a rational basis of priority and need.
• National Resilience Standards.

The LRF is not a legal entity. The CCA, however, provides that responders, through the LRF, have a collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multi-agency environment.

The purpose of the LRF is to ensure effective delivery of those duties under the CCA that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment, and individually as a Category 1 responder.

LRFs are based on police areas and help responders at the local level to coordinate and cooperate. It should be noted that LRFs do not fit neatly to the geographic boundaries of other responder organisations, and it is important that relationships are built as part of the planning process. For example, there may be several fire and rescue services within one LRF but an ambulance service may cover three or four different LRFs. This can present challenges that the police need to be aware of.

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) coordinates government’s response to major emergencies at a national level.

The Home Office’s Public Safety Group Emergency Response Team (PSG ERT) is involved in high-profile and emerging incidents where there is parliamentary and media interest. Their roles and responsibilities are as follows.

• They are the primary point of contact for the Home Office’s initial response to all critical incidents led by the police and fire services. This includes protest, public order, serious violence, civil contingencies, major fire, cyber incidents (influencing police and/or fire), manhunts and other high-profile incidents.
• They provide a crosscutting coordination and reporting function for Home Office ministers, senior officials and colleagues across government departments.
• They are the primary government point of contact for any operational policing and fire service engagement during an incident, working in close collaboration with the Home Office fire duty officer.

PSG ERT can be contacted 24/7 at:

• PSGERT@homeoffice.gov.uk
• 0300 071 2364

Cabinet Office briefing rooms (COBR)

COBR is the primary organisational structure for agreeing the central government response to major emergencies that have international, national or multi-regional effects. COBR is also the physical location from which the response is activated, monitored and coordinated. COBR unites the government’s response into one reliable source of information and advice for local responders.

COBR brings together appropriate ministers and senior officials from relevant departments and agencies, along with representatives from other organisations as necessary. This ensures a common appreciation of the situation and assists effective and timely decision making.

In general, the chair will be the Secretary of State and the government department with lead responsibility for the issue being considered, a Cabinet Office minister, or the Prime Minister. Meetings at COBR are in effect Cabinet committee meetings, although there is no fixed membership. They can meet at ministerial (M) or official (O) level depending on the issue under consideration.

The UK uses a lead government department (LGD) model to cover all phases of emergency planning, response, recovery and risk assessment. Designated LGDs are responsible at a national level for taking the lead across the different phases of an emergency for risks.

For more information go to:

• an overview of LGD roles and responsibilities for different types of emergency (Cabinet Office, 2023)
• The LDG and its role – guidance and best practice (Cabinet Office, 2004)
• The Amber Book – managing crisis in central government

COBR functions

The COBR structure is designed to be flexible to adapt to the circumstances at hand. There might be several COBR meetings for a single incident, depending on the nature of the emergency and its consequences.

When COBR is activated, or where the incident is of national interest, a government liaison officer (GLO) will normally be dispatched to the strategic coordination centre (SCC) to act as the primary liaison channel between government departments and local responders. The GLO provides a useful information conduit both to and from COBR and can flag up requests for additional capability.

COBR oversees the strategic aspects of the response and can ensure that national assets are provided to support the local activity. This includes the development of a national communications strategy.

COBR attendance

COBR does not have a fixed membership and attendance is based on the nature of the emergency and the situation and contingencies at the time. COBR may require representation from the police, which may include any of the following.

• National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) chair.
• National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) commander.
• National Policing Lead.
• Local strategic coordinating group (SCG) chair and/or police strategic commander.

It is highly likely that the SCG chair or police strategic commander may be required to take part by video- or tele-conferencing to ensure the local perspective is provided to ministers.

Scientific and technical advice

During a major incident, there may be a requirement for an SCG to obtain timely scientific and technical advice. This supports the response to the incident and maintains the safety and health of the community and emergency responders. It also protects the environment. At a local level, scientific and technical advice is primarily provided to the SCG by local scientific and technical advice cells (STAC). The decision to set up a local STAC is the responsibility of the local strategic coordination group.

Other sources of scientific and technical advice might include the: 

• Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)
• Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice (ECOSA)  
• cyber technical advice cell (CTAC), formed with representation from the National Security Cyber Centre (NSCC)

A well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency, whilst minimising the impact to the affected community. By informing the public (and staff) as best they can, all organisations may build their trust. This includes avoiding alarming the public unnecessarily.

The Civil Contingencies Act requires Category 1 responders to warn and inform the public of emergencies and possible actions they may take to minimise the impact.

Certain incidents (such as those involving hazardous materials or fumes) require a dynamic assessment of information and timely dissemination to the public. The lead agency, together with other responding agencies, should consider at the SCG whether dissemination of information or advice to the public is required, especially during the initial stages before the arrangements such as the specific communications sub-group has been stood up.

Accurate and up to date information is essential. A variety of methods may be used to communicate with the public, including:

• mainstream and social media
• local broadcast by emergency services public announcement systems
• via frontline responders
• through door-to-door communications

Consideration should be given to briefing responders with appropriate information/advice in case of questions from members of the public. Consideration should be given at the planning stage to manage public expectations, offers of assistance and support and should be a consideration of operational commanders from the outset.