This page is from APP, the official source of professional practice for policing.
Civil emergencies response is based on consequence management. The capability and capacity to respond is based on the anticipated requirements identified through a comprehensive planning process with partners.
Developing plans
Major incident plans should have the JESIP principles at their centre.
The planning process should include:
- Scoping and identifying a proportionate number of trained officers who have the experience and availability to work within the major incident command structure. This process should consider force capability and capacity to respond to sudden onset events.
- Consideration of force command rotas, particularly the capacity of commanders who may be required to fulfil more than one role during a major incident.
- Testing all call-out and other operational deployment processes, to provide assurance and check that resourcing plans will remain resilient to real-life situations and scenarios.
Plans should be regularly reviewed and include the views of specialists as appropriate.
Testing and exercising plans
Chief officers should ensure they have a robust process to review, test and exercise their major incident plans alongside their local resilience forums. This includes appropriate training and awareness on the content and delivery of the plan. Important principles must be shared with relevant parties, including relevant processes for testing and exercising of the plans.
Testing and exercising of the plans should:
- include the management of concurrent threats/civil emergencies or incidents
- be aware of any change in threat level and the resulting resource demand
National resilience planning assumptions
The government strategy is to prepare for consequences that are common to most risk scenarios – for example, a large number of casualties and fatalities, major disruption to transport, or significant loss of energy.
The common consequences of emergencies and their maximum plausible scale, duration and magnitude are defined in the National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPA) communities.
NRPAs are shared with Category 1 responders. Police forces use planning assumptions in chapter four of the National Policing Requirement (NPR, 2012) when detailing the response required to counter the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR, 2023) threats. Local resilience forum (LRF) members should use NRPAs to inform local-level planning.
Planning assumptions inform the work of the cross-government National Resilience Capabilities Programme. This programme coordinates work to build and maintain capability to respond to the common consequences of emergencies.
Major incident plans – command support functions
Planning units should ensure appropriate functions are in place to provide adequate support to the commanders at all tiers of command up to and including the SCG.
These functions or cells should use the following principles (which form the mnemonic PIRLFLW):
- Planning
- Information/Intelligence
- Resources
- Logistics
- Financial
- Legal
- Welfare/Wellbeing
Following an assessment of resource requirements, where it is determined that the required capability exceeds both force capacity and existing local mutual aid arrangements, the strategic commander should declare a mobilisation event. They should also submit a request for assistance to the relevant Regional Information and Coordination Centre (RICC).
In the first instance, the RICC will seek to meet the requirement through tier two mutual aid, drawing on resources from within the relevant policing region. Where tier two mutual aid is insufficient to satisfy the identified need, the RiCC will escalate the request to the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) for tier three (national) mutual aid support.
For further information, go to:
Critical infrastructure failure or cyber event
Forces should consider the contingencies required for a total loss of critical infrastructure and communications as part of a failure of systems. This could be caused by:
- the ongoing incident
- a natural event such as flooding
- power failure and loss of backup systems
- an orchestrated cyber-attack on one or more of the emergency services.
Where the incident is related to a cyber event, a cyber technical advice cell (CTAC) is formed including representation from the National Security Cyber Centre (NSCC). Plans for critical national infrastructure sites should take account of the risk of a cyber security breach in addition to power failure due to other incidents such as flooding.
Excess death
An excess death event is an outcome that challenges the delivery of the normal death management process, resulting from either:
- environmental factors (such as a heatwave, cold weather or air quality)
- health-related factors (for example, outbreak of communicable disease affecting large sections of the population)
Initiation of an excess death plan follows the activation of other regional or national frameworks – such as the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (according to the World Health Organization) or Adverse Weather and Health Plan (according to GOV.UK) – at the appropriate time.
An excess death plan considers the levels upon which local/regional plans and capabilities have exceeded their localised thresholds. During the COVID-19 pandemic, policing ownership for excess death was taken into the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) disaster victim identification and Casualty Bureau portfolio. The Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat has provided guidance for local planners in England and Wales for possible influenza pandemics and a national planning assumptions assessment tool.
Mortality Management Group
Following activation of the Excess Death Framework by the SCG, the Mortality Management Group (MMG) is triggered. The MMG includes relevant organisations with responsibilities for delivering the stages of the death management process. This process includes many organisations, legal requirements and interdependencies. Sub-groups are recommended to ensure processes are monitored and managed.
The SCG operates at the strategic level. The MMG brings together very specific organisations – some will be strategic – managing and commissioning services in the region(s). Tactical delivery works closely with sub-groups, coordinating and tracking activities where relevant and reporting into the MMG providing tactical oversight of the excess death process. This group is also responsible for resolving any issues that may arise before they escalate. The chairs of the delivery and sub-groups are members of the MMG.
Role of the police in major incident investigations
If it is clear that criminality is the cause of the incident, the police lead any investigations. Support may be required from specialist investigators from other agencies.
Where the cause is not immediately identifiable, the police follow standard procedures to preserve continuity of evidence. If there is no criminal activity, this assists industry-specific investigators when they arrive on the scene. Officers on the scene should follow the investigative golden hour principles.
The police may be asked to assist with investigations carried out by specialists.
Risk assessment
Risk assessments should be completed for all operations and should:
- identify hazards that could cause harm to police officers and staff
- assess the risks that may arise from those hazards
- ensure that all control measures are in place
- note if any further action is required to eliminate or control the risks
As the incident progresses, the officer in charge must continually assess any new hazards or risks and reassess any identified existing risks. Risk assessment forms should be retained by the officer in charge and filed with all relevant documentation. This risk assessment is intended to identify hazards that could cause harm, to assess the risks that may arise from those hazards, and to decide on suitable measures to eliminate or control the risks.
Incidents involving fatalities
Where an incident involves fatalities, the general principles of Lord Justice Clarke should be kept in mind throughout the identification process. The Charter for families bereaved through public tragedy should also be given due consideration.
For further information go to the Disaster victim identification APP. Also refer to your force’s local mass fatality plans.
Casualty bureau
The police service is the lead agency for the Casualty Bureau.
A Casualty Bureau does not require fatalities to be activated. It can be started where there are numerous survivors requiring management. For further information go to Incidents involving fatalities and Excess death.
The strategic commander may establish a Casualty Bureau where details on all deceased, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated. The Casualty Bureau takes telephone or online enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident. This includes reviewing and assessing all information submitted via the Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP).
Casualty Bureau staff should then match details of persons involved with enquiries. Where a match is made, appropriate contact with the enquirer should be made.
The Casualty Bureau should not close until:
- all the casualties have been identified
- all next of kin have been informed
- telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area
Mass fatality coordination group (MFCG)
A mass fatality incident is any incident where the number of fatalities is greater than normal local arrangements can manage. If an incident involving fatalities requires a Mass Fatality Coordination Group (MFCG), this should be established in consultation with HM Coroner. HM Coroner and/or SIM will represent the MFCG at the SCG. The MFCG coordinates all aspects of the disaster victim identification (DVI) process on behalf of HM Coroner.
For further information go to the Disaster victim identification APP. Also refer to your force’s local mass fatality plans.