

# Command, control and coordination

This page is from APP, the official source of professional practice for policing.

First published 23 October 2013 Updated 20 April 2026

Written by College of Policing

37 mins read

## National structure

There is an agreed national framework for managing the local multi-agency response to emergencies. Command, control and coordination are important concepts in a multi-agency response. In a large-scale, multi-agency coordination situation, the control structure is convened at strategic, tactical and operational levels, following the generic response structure in the [JESIP Joint Doctrine](#).

## National Police Coordination

If the potential scale, complexity, or impact of an event or incident necessitates it, the National Police Coordination Centre will establish a multi-force, national, or National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) coordination group. If necessary, a chief officer will be appointed as a national coordinator to enable an effective response. In line with the NPCC national coordination framework, chief officers may be required to perform a role in:

- force executive oversight - supporting the force gold commander, or concurrent force golds, with any wider impacts on the force, this function does not direct the gold commander (who retains strategic command of the response) but oversees the wider consequences or contingencies for the operation(s) which may be impacting on the force as a whole
- multi-force coordination - to coordinate a regional response or represent their force at a multi-force response group
- national coordination - to represent their force or region at a national coordination group
- NPCC coordination - to represent their national portfolio, force or region at an NPCC group, to consider the consequences and contingencies for the wider service

These structures will be focused on supporting and coordinating the policing elements of the response, and do not direct or replace the multi-agency SCG and TCG forums.

## National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC)

The role of NPoCC is to coordinate the provision of all police mutual aid (except counter terrorism assets) in response to requests from forces. It provides advice and guidance to ensure national consistency. The NPoCC also plays a role in coordinating the policing response to pre-planned and dynamic events that require input from multiple forces, for example, coordinating the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

See also the [Mobilisation APP](#).

## Police control room

This is likely to be the initial point of contact when an emergency or major incident occurs. During an incident, the control room supervisor and/or the force incident manager should encourage control rooms to remind first responders of METHANE and the JESIP principles.

On initial contact, the control room should:

- facilitate the deployment of first responders
- gather information about the incident using the [METHANE](#) mnemonic
- advise and support first responders where necessary
- declare a major incident or determine whether one has been declared
- advise partner agencies that a major incident has been declared
- if appropriate, establish a three-way conference call with the fire and ambulance control rooms to ensure shared situational awareness
- establish Airwave interoperability channel and appoint airwave tactical advisor
- activate force response framework or [local emergency plans](#)
- establish contact with the initial tactical commander
- facilitate a forward command post
- facilitate a command structure
- maintain a communications log that includes event information, as well as health and safety risk assessments

- consider the possibility of the incident involving hazardous or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials

## Force incident manager (FIM)

The overarching aim of the FIM is to ensure rapid and effective actions are implemented that save lives, minimise harm and mitigate the incident. They should:

- be aware of and understand the multi-agency command structure, commander roles, responsibilities, requirements and capabilities (including gaps), and monitor the operational command structure, including functional roles
- determine whether the situation merits activating the strategic level of coordination and recommend accordingly
- start, if appropriate, and identify a chair for a multi-agency **tactical coordinating group** meeting at the earliest opportunity and convene them at regular intervals to maintain shared situational awareness
- share and co-ordinate operational plans to ensure multi-agency compatibility and understanding of initial tactical priorities and ongoing tactics
- ensure that all tactical decisions made – and the rationale behind them – are documented in a decision log, ensuring that a clear audit trail exists

## Operational commander

The operational commander controls and deploys the resources of their respective service within a functional or geographical area and implements the directions of the tactical commander. As the incident progresses and more resources attend the scene, the level of supervision increases proportionally.

The suggested initial actions for a police operational commander are shown below and take into consideration learning from **JESIP**.

## Initial actions for operational commanders

The overarching aim of the operational commander is to ensure that rapid and effective actions are implemented that save lives, minimise harm and mitigate the incident. To achieve, this they need to ensure the following.

- Make an initial assessment of the situation, conducting a **joint dynamic risk assessment**. Ensure that appropriate resources are requested and, where appropriate, that a declaration of a major incident and/or a critical incident takes place.
- Ensure that resources are deployed appropriately to specific roles or locations, such as cordons or traffic management (local authority or highways role). Further resources may be deployed to an identified rendezvous point.
- Have an understanding of the role of each agency in the effective management and coordination of victims, survivors and relatives.
- Use the **joint decision model (JDM)** to establish shared situational awareness by agreeing a common view of the situation, its consequences and potential outcomes and the actions required for its resolution. This should be supported by timely METHANE updates prompted by the FIM if necessary.
- Carry out a briefing using recognised models such as **IIMARCH** (information, intent, method, administration, risk assessment, communications, humanitarian issues) or **SAFCOM** (situation, aim, factors, choices, options, monitoring) at the earliest opportunity. Ensure at regular intervals that the message is clear and commonly understood.
- Convene joint meetings and use the **JDM** to share and coordinate information, intelligence and operational plans, to ensure multi-agency compatibility and a clear understanding of the initial tactical priorities and ongoing tactics.
- Use the **JDM** to maintain shared situational awareness through effective communication to multi-agency organisations, to assist in the implementation of the operational plan.
- Use the **JDM** to construct a joint action plan, and the priorities necessary for its execution, in sufficient detail for each service to have a clear understanding of the other responders' future activities by nature, location and time. Understand all the multi-agency operational commander roles, core responsibilities, requirements and capabilities (including gaps).
- Identify and agree the triggers, signals and arrangements for the emergency evacuation of the scene or area within it, or similar urgent control measures.
- Use the **JDM** to conduct, record and share ongoing dynamic risk assessments, putting in place appropriate control measures with appropriate actions and review.
- Understand how continually changing hazards and risks affect each organisation, and work with their multi-agency colleagues to address these issues.
- Ensure that their legal and statutory responsibilities are met and action them in relation to the health, safety and welfare of individuals from their organisation during the response.

- Make and share decisions within the agreed level of responsibility, being cognisant of consequence management. Disseminate these decisions for action to multi-agency colleagues.
- Use the **JDM** to identify and action the challenges that their organisation's operational plan may cause multi-agency partners.
- Determine whether the situation requires the activation of the next level of command support (TCG) and make appropriate recommendations.
- Update the tactical commander on any changes, including any variation in agreed multi-agency tactics within the geographical or functional area of responsibility.
- Ensure appropriate support at the scene by the organisation, in terms of communications operatives and loggists. The amount and type of support will be determined by the incident.
- Consider organisational post-incident procedures, carrying out a hot debrief of staff where appropriate.

It is important that both operational and tactical commanders are easily identifiable on the ground by means of identification tabards. In **public order** incidents, it may not be appropriate for police commanders to wear a tabard. When this happens, other emergency services should be briefed in how to identify police public order commanders by alternative methods.

## Tactical commander

First responders are responsible for tactics in the initial stages of an incident. Once the scale and nature of the incident is known, emergency services appoint officers to act as tactical commanders for their organisation. Other agencies may also send representatives to the scene (or other appropriate location) to act as either tactical commanders or coordinators on behalf of their organisations.

The tactical commander is likely to be in place before the **strategic commander** and likely to be the first senior officer taking command of the incident. The tactical commander needs to set priorities before the **strategic commander** has set a strategy.

In the event of the incident involving fatalities, the police may, at an early stage, appoint a scene evidence recovery manager (SERM), who acts as the disaster scene coordinator. The SERM is responsible to the **senior investigating officer** (SIO) and **senior identification manager** (SIM).

With major incidents, the initial tactical commander may use the following prompts as considerations in understanding their role:

- What – what are the aims and objectives to be achieved?
- Who – who by, what resources are available?
- When – when are the timescales, deadlines and milestones for delivering tasks?
- Where – what locations?
- Why – what is the rationale within the overall aims and objectives set by the strategic commander (if in place)?
- How – how are these tasks going to be achieved, what barriers to achieving them may be encountered?

## Initial actions for tactical commanders

The suggested initial actions for a police tactical commander are shown below and take into consideration learning from [JESIP](#).

The overarching aim of the tactical commander is to ensure rapid and effective actions are implemented that save lives, minimise harm and mitigate the incident. The [JDM](#) should be used as the standing agenda for [tactical coordinating group \(TCG\)](#) meetings. To achieve the overarching aim, commanders need to ensure the following.

- Be aware of, and understand, the multi-agency command structure, commander roles, responsibilities, requirements and capabilities (including gaps) and monitor the operational command structure, including functioning roles, maintaining regular communications with those commanders.
- Determine whether the situation merits the activation of the strategic level of coordination and recommend accordingly.
- Establish a common view of the situation between the responder agencies. Initiate (if appropriate) and identify the chair of a multi-agency TCG at the earliest opportunity, and then ensure shared situational awareness at regular intervals.
- Construct and agree the overall joint intent, objectives and concept of operations for their achievement within a joint plan. At regular intervals, assess and disseminate the available information and intelligence through the appropriate communication links, to properly evaluate threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, and own actions, in order to establish and maintain multi-agency

shared situational awareness and promote effective decision-making.

- Provide accurate and timely information to notify and protect communities, working with the media and utilising social media through a multi-agency approach. Consider the establishment of a media cell.
- Understand how continually changing threats and hazards affect each organisation. Work with multi-agency colleagues to conduct **joint dynamic risk assessments**, putting in place appropriate mitigation and management arrangements to continually monitor and respond to the changing nature of emergencies for the organisation.
- Ensure the legal and statutory responsibilities for the police are met, and that doctrine is considered in relation to health, safety, human rights, data protection and welfare of individuals during the response.
- Share and coordinate operational plans to ensure multi-agency compatibility and understanding of both the initial tactical priorities and ongoing tactics.
- Identify and agree a common multi-agency forward control point for all operational commanders and remain suitably located, in order to maintain effective tactical command of the incident or operation and maintain shared situational awareness.
- Where required, manage and coordinate multi-agency resources and activities, providing a joined-up and directed response.
- In a multiple fatality incident, liaise with the SERM and DVI scene coordinator.
- Ensure that all tactical decisions that are made, as well as the rationale behind them, are documented in a decision log, to ensure that a clear audit trail exists for all multi-agency debriefs and future multi-agency learning. Ensure that those decisions are communicated effectively to appropriate commanders or organisations.
- Assist with, or make available, debriefing facilities (supporting the operational commander and debriefing them).

As the response to the emergency or major incident develops, the initial tactical commander may be replaced by another officer more senior in rank and one with appropriate training, skills and abilities to perform that role efficiently and effectively.

## Tactical coordination centre

The tactical coordination centre should house the resources required to manage a fast-moving incident effectively. This includes an intelligence cell linked to social media through non-identifiable

channels, to gather useful information from social media users to assist with the response to the incident. Where this information is open source, there is no requirement for a Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) authority.

The requirement for an authority must be continually reviewed. An example of when a RIPA authority would be required is when access to private information was obtained by accessing a private account without notifying the owner of the account or others who are affected by collateral intrusion.

## **Tactical coordinating group (TCG)**

All emergency services appoint tactical commanders for their organisations. Other agencies may also send representatives to the scene to act as tactical coordinators. The police tactical commander should bring all these representatives together and form a TCG.

Communication and coordination between commanders at a scene is vital. Tactical commanders should be located at a mutually agreed location where they can maintain effective joint command of the operation. This includes effective joint working with other services and consideration should be given to factors, such as access to communications systems. In some circumstances, a visit to the scene may be required.

The location of the tactical commander, may be informed by the:

- scale of the incident
- need to maintain a tactical overview
- ability to gain information from a wide range of sources
- need to liaise effectively with the other emergency services and responding agencies

The TCG should meet as frequently as required by the circumstances of the incident. The meetings are set within an agreed schedule, to ensure that the updates are available to the SCG and nationally. Key decisions should be recorded for audit purposes.

A standard agenda can be used, similar to the one suggested for SCG meetings, but focused on tactical issues. In the initial stages of a spontaneous incident, information and intelligence needs to be kept under constant review and shared as appropriate as incident dynamics might change. For example, what is initially reported as a terrorist attack might prove otherwise, and vice versa. The

**JDM** should be used to assist in formulating this process.

## TCG initial agenda

1. Tactical commander introduction.
2. Introduction of attendees – name and organisation.
3. Outline of what has happened by TCG chair.
4. Any urgent actions or issues that require immediate attention or discussion.
5. Has a major incident been declared? If not, should one be declared?
6. Identify and agree on any specialist cells that need to be established, such as logistics or voluntary sector coordination.
7. Updates from identified scene commanders or operational as required – most operational updates will be provided by their agency tactical commander. Once the commanders have given their updates, they may leave the tele-conference. This is to allow them to resume their operational duties. Any actions for them will be recorded by the TCG and given to them after the meeting or, if urgent, a TCG member of staff will contact them separately.
8. Updates from each agency – if weather-related, start with the Met Office followed by the Environment Agency, then each other agency in turn.
9. Any requests for assistance from partners.
10. Current command structure – what strategic, tactical and operational commands have been established or need to be established?
11. Review current membership of TCG – are there any agencies and departments that need to be included in the next meeting?
12. In the event of no SCG sitting, the TCG may need to consider setting the strategy.
13. Media and social media – including warning and informing the public. Identify the lead agency for media.
14. Confirm tactical plan.
15. Time and date of next meeting.

## Strategic commander

The strategic commander is the identified lead representing each organisation involved in the incident. They are responsible for establishing and managing policy, strategy and the overall response framework for the individual organisations.

Any police officer being appointed as strategic commander at a major incident must have:

- completed the mandated Multi Agency Gold Incident Command (MAGIC) course
- maintained continued professional development

## Initial actions for strategic commanders

The suggested initial actions for a police strategic commander are shown as follows and take into consideration learning from the [Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles \(JESIP\)](#).

- Protect life, property and environment.
- Set, review and update the strategy, based on available intelligence and the threat and risk.
- Attend and possibly chair a strategic coordination group (SCG), if established, or consider the need to request that an SCG is set up.
- Consult partner agencies and community groups when determining the strategy.
- Should not be directly involved in making tactical-level decisions.
- Consider setting parameters within which the tactical command can work.
- Become involved in briefings where appropriate.
- Remain available to other agency strategic or tactical tiers of command, to ensure that appropriate communication mechanisms exist at a local, regional and national level.
- Ensure that, where appropriate, command protocols are set, agreed and understood by all relevant parties.
- Secure strategic resources in order to resolve the incident and prioritise the allocation of resources, where appropriate.
- Ensure that there are clear lines of communication between Category 1 and 2 responders and all appropriate agencies.
- Review and ensure the resilience and effectiveness of the command team, identifies the requirements for assistance from the wider resilience community and manages them accordingly.
- Plan beyond the immediate response phase for recovering from the emergency and returning to normality.
- Have overall responsibility within the command structure for health and safety, diversity, equality and human rights compliance, and for ensuring that relevant impact assessments are completed.
- Identify the level of support needed to resolve the incident or operation and resource their agency's response.
- Have responsibility for the development of communication and media strategies.

- Consider the post-incident hot debriefs and multi-agency debrief.

## Strategic command

It's essential that appropriate provisions are implemented as soon as possible to support the strategic commander and the SCG.

The scale and nature of this support will be relative to the emergency or major incident.

## Strategic coordination centre (SCC)

The function of the SCC is to provide a location and infrastructure to enable the SCG to coordinate their response. LRFs should have a flexible plan to open elements of an SCC to provide the support necessary for specific incidents.

The SCC may be divided into the following cells or groups as required. These may include:

- planning, intelligence, resources, logistics, finance and legal cells
- mass fatalities coordination team
- recovery working group
- communication and information group (media group)
- environment, infrastructure and utilities group
- government liaison team
- **scientific and technical advice cell** (STAC) or emergency coordination of scientific advice (ECOSA)

The SCG sets strategy. This strategy is cascaded to the tactical coordinating group (TCG), which in turn undertakes multi-agency tactical planning. In the event that the incident is 'bottom up' and the TCG forms before the SCG (or no SCG is required), they may fulfil both the strategic and tactical planning functions.

The SCG should agree on the media and communication strategy and the lead agency.

It is recognised that emergency service control rooms will receive large volumes of enquiries from both the public and the media. To manage demand, planners should develop major incident plans that ensure calls from the media are not managed through control rooms.

Where the incident has national implications, there will be a requirement to engage with the NPCC communications team, to ensure consistency in messaging.

TCG representatives cascade their agency requirements and actions to the operational commanders, who carry out the detailed single agency planning and maintain the command and control of deployed resources.

This is supported by the [National Resilience Standards](#).

## Communications

Chief officers should ensure their force is able to prepare, train and exercise how they will maintain effective radio communications between emergency responders, commanders and control rooms during the response to a major incident. They should also ensure that an appropriate contact system for on-duty and on-call commanders is in place.

The airwave network provides the essential radio network for the police, fire, ambulance and other organisations to communicate securely. Airwave provides the emergency services with a means for working together with a shared talkgroup and communicating and coordinating across the command and control structures.

To support the joint decision-making process, commanders should consider early engagement with suitably trained tactical advisors. These include Airwave communications tactical advisors (CTAs) and liaison with inhouse Airwave teams.

CTAs should be trained by the College of Policing to provide each police force with operational and technical guidance on achieving the optimal use of Airwave. They should liaise with in-force Airwave teams that may have broader experience and knowledge of the specific coverage, configuration and capacity of their force.

## Local resilience forums (LRF)

Responder organisations come together to form local resilience forums (LRFs) to facilitate co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). Specifically, [Category 1 responders](#), supported by [Category 2 responders](#), as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Planning is done through an LRF. This should include awareness of

## business continuity.

The LRF planning process is assisted by the following products (available through ResilienceDirect).

- Strategic Policing Requirement.
- National Policing Requirement.
- National Resilience Planning Assumptions.
- National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) – the NSRA identifies and assesses the most serious risks facing the UK. The information is used by LRFs to develop a community risk register enabling the LRF to focus multi-agency work on a rational basis of priority and need.
- National Resilience Standards.

The LRF is not a legal entity. The CCA, however, provides that responders, through the LRF, have a collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multi-agency environment.

The purpose of the LRF is to ensure effective delivery of those duties under the CCA that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment, and individually as a Category 1 responder.

LRFs are based on police areas and help responders at the local level to coordinate and cooperate. It should be noted that LRFs do not fit neatly to the geographic boundaries of other responder organisations, and it is important that relationships are built as part of the planning process. For example, there may be several fire and rescue services within one LRF but an ambulance service may cover three or four different LRFs. This can present challenges that the police need to be aware of.

## Generic and specific plans

There are two types of plans. These are categorised as generic and specific.

Generic planning considers common consequences of the different risks that are faced – for example, high numbers of casualties and fatalities, or disruption to transport and utilities.

Generic plans are supplemented by specific plans for those risks that merit it, such as wide area flooding or an influenza pandemic leading to excess death. This approach gives a degree of insurance for unanticipated events. It is also proportionate, with more resource-intensive, risk-based planning reserved only for the risks of most concern.

## National government

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) coordinates government's response to major emergencies at a national level.

The Home Office's Public Safety Group Emergency Response Team (PSG ERT) is involved in high-profile and emerging incidents, where there is parliamentary and media interest. Their roles and responsibilities are as follows.

- They are the primary point of contact for the Home Office's initial response to all critical incidents led by the police and fire services. This includes protest, public order, serious violence, civil contingencies, major fire, cyber incidents (influencing police and/or fire), manhunts and other high-profile incidents.
- They provide a crosscutting coordination and reporting function for Home Office ministers, senior officials and colleagues across government departments.
- They are the primary government point of contact for any operational policing and fire service engagement during an incident, working in close collaboration with the Home Office fire duty officer.

PSG ERT can be contacted 24/7 at:

- [PSGERT@homeoffice.gov.uk](mailto:PSGERT@homeoffice.gov.uk)
- 0300 071 2364

## Cabinet Office briefing rooms (COBR)

COBR is the primary organisational structure for agreeing the central government response to major emergencies that have international, national or multi-regional effects. COBR is also the physical location from which the response is activated, monitored and coordinated. COBR unites the government's response into one reliable source of information and advice for local responders.

COBR brings together appropriate ministers and senior officials from relevant departments and agencies, along with representatives from other organisations as necessary. This ensures a common appreciation of the situation and assists effective and timely decision-making.

In general, the chair will be the Secretary of State and the government department with lead responsibility for the issue being considered, a Cabinet Office minister, or the Prime Minister. Meetings at COBR are in effect Cabinet committee meetings, although there is no fixed membership. They can meet at ministerial (M) or official (O) level depending on the issue under consideration.

The UK uses a lead government department (LGD) model to cover all phases of emergency planning, response, recovery and risk assessment. Designated LGDs are responsible at a national level for taking the lead across the different phases of an emergency for risks.

For more information go to:

- [an overview of LGD roles and responsibilities for different types of emergency](#) (Cabinet Office, 2023)
- [The LDG and its role – guidance and best practice](#) (Cabinet Office, 2004)
- [The Amber Book – managing crisis in central government](#)

## COBR functions

The COBR structure is designed to be flexible to adapt to the circumstances at hand. There might be several COBR meetings for a single incident, depending on the nature of the emergency and its consequences.

When COBR is activated, or where the incident is of national interest, a government liaison officer (GLO) will normally be dispatched to the [strategic coordination centre \(SCC\)](#) to act as the primary liaison channel between government departments and local responders. The GLO provides a useful information conduit both to and from COBR and can flag up requests for additional capability.

COBR oversees the strategic aspects of the response and can ensure that national assets are provided to support the local activity. This includes the development of a national communications strategy.

## COBR attendance

COBR does not have a fixed membership and attendance is based on the nature of the emergency and the situation and contingencies at the time. COBR may require representation from the police, which may include any of the following.

- National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) chair.
- National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) commander.
- National Policing Lead.
- Local SCG chair and/or police strategic commander.

It is highly likely that the SCG chair or police strategic commander may be required to take part by video- or tele-conferencing to ensure the local perspective is provided to ministers.

## Scientific and Technical Advice

During a major incident, there may be a requirement for an SCG to obtain timely scientific and technical advice. This supports the response to the incident and maintains the safety and health of the community and emergency responders. It also protects the environment. At a local level, scientific and technical advice is primarily provided to the SCG by local scientific and technical advice cells (STAC). The decision to set up a local STAC is the responsibility of the local strategic coordination group.

Other sources of scientific and technical advice might include the:

- Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)
- Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice (ECOSA)
- cyber technical advice cell (CTAC), formed with representation from the National Security Cyber Centre (NSCC)

## Warning and informing the public

A well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency, whilst minimising the impact to the affected community. By informing the public (and staff) as best they can, all organisations may build their trust. This includes avoiding alarming the public unnecessarily.

The Civil Contingencies Act requires Category 1 responders to warn and inform the public of emergencies and possible actions they may take to minimise the impact.

Certain incidents (such as those involving hazardous materials or fumes) require a dynamic assessment of information and timely dissemination to the public. The lead agency, together with other responding agencies, should consider at the SCG whether dissemination of information or advice to the public is required, especially during the initial stages before the arrangements such as the specific communications sub-group has been stood up.

Accurate and up to date information is essential. A variety of methods may be used to communicate with the public, including:

- mainstream and social media
- local broadcast by emergency services public announcement systems
- via frontline responders
- through door-to-door communications

Consideration should be given to briefing responders with appropriate information/advice in case of questions from members of the public. Consideration should be given at the planning stage to manage public expectations, offers of assistance and support and should be a consideration of operational commanders from the outset.

## National emergency alert system

[Emergency Alerts is a UK government service](#) (GOV.UK) that will warn the public if there's a danger to life nearby. In an emergency, a mobile phone or tablet will receive an alert with advice about how to stay safe.

The public may get alerts about:

- severe flooding
- fires
- extreme weather

Emergency alerts are only be sent by government departments, agencies and public bodies that deal with emergencies.

## Mutual aid and mobilisation

If the resources required by an incident or emergency exceed local capacity and/or capability, the strategic (gold) commander should declare a mobilisation event. The strategic (gold) commander should document the decision, including its rationale and then request mobilisation from within the region, via the Regional Information Coordination Centre (RICC).

If resources are required from outside of the region, the RICC will contact the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC). NPoCC coordinates the provision of all police mutual aid (except counter terrorism assets).

See the [authorised professional practice \(APP\) on Mobilisation](#) for information about supporting mutual aid.

## Incidents involving fatalities

Where an incident involves fatalities, the general principles of Lord Justice Clarke should be kept in mind throughout the identification process. The '[Charter for families bereaved through public tragedy](#)' should also be given due consideration.

For further information see the [Disaster victim identification APP](#). Also refer to your force's local mass fatality plans.

## Casualty bureau

The police service is the lead agency for the Casualty Bureau.

A Casualty Bureau does not require fatalities to be activated. It can be started where there are numerous survivors requiring management. For further information see [Incidents involving fatalities](#) and [Excess death](#).

The strategic commander may establish a Casualty Bureau where details on all deceased, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated. The Casualty Bureau takes telephone or online enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident. This includes reviewing and assessing all information submitted via the Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP).

Casualty Bureau staff should then match details of persons involved with enquiries. Where a match is made, appropriate contact with the enquirer should be made.

The Casualty Bureau should not close until:

- all the casualties have been identified
- all next of kin have been informed
- telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area

## Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP)

The police service is the lead agency for the MIPP.

All staff involved in a major incident response should consider using the MIPP to obtain information from both public and police sources during a major investigation (for example, murder) or major incident.

Where an incident requires the activation of a Casualty Bureau, the public can use the MIPP to report the details of those they believe to be involved. Incident specific forms can be created to record information to help the enquiry. They can also upload images and other materials, all of which are sent to the Casualty Bureau directly.

Passcode protected MIPP forms allow responders to submit information such as details of survivors' first accounts and other information. This includes investigative triage forms for completion at hospitals or survivor reception centres (SuRCs). If relevant, partner agencies can assist members of the public in completing these forms instead of being interviewed by a police officer.

For further information see the [Disaster victim identification APP](#). Also refer to your force's local mass fatality plans.

## Mass fatality coordination group (MFCG)

A mass fatality incident is any incident where the number of fatalities is greater than normal local arrangements can manage. If an incident involving fatalities requires a Mass Fatality Coordination

Group (MFCG), this should be established in consultation with HM Coroner. HM Coroner and/or SIM will represent the MFCG at the SCG. The MFCG coordinates all aspects of the disaster victim identification (DVI) process on behalf of HM Coroner.

For further information see the [Disaster victim identification APP](#). Also refer to your force's local mass fatality plans.

## Tags

Civil emergencies   Force control rooms