

# Response

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In the event of an emergency or major incident, it is necessary to establish a dedicated command structure.

The civil contingencies command and control structure is based on strategic, tactical and operational commands. The principles of command and control are scalable and can be applied across different levels from national to local and in a multi-agency setting.

Response and recovery arrangements should follow a common set of underlying principles, but should also be flexible and able to be tailored to reflect individual circumstances.

This common framework contributes to a cohesive multi-agency response and good shared situational awareness. The principles apply across tiers at all levels.

The response process consists of the following phases:

- reaction
- rescue
- retrieval and investigation

## Reaction

This is the first phase of the response process. Key activities for the reaction phase include:

- completing a **METHANE** or ETHANE report
- coordinating initial reports
- declaring a major incident, when appropriate
- activating the response framework and/or local emergency plans
- activating notification cascades to relevant people
- establishing a command and control structure (multi-agency, where appropriate) for the incident

- establishing an Airwave communications interoperability plan
- activating **command support** functions
- identifying and deploying resources
- identifying safe and suitable rendezvous points
- considering initial health and safety guidance for responding personnel
- declaring a mobilisation
- containing measures to prevent escalation of the incident
- implementing business continuity management plans, if required
- consideration of public health advice and establishing a **scientific and technical advice cell (STAC)**

## METHANE


The METHANE model is an established reporting framework that provides a common structure for responders and their control rooms to share incident information.

The model takes the user through the declaration of a major incident, exact location, type of incident, hazards, access, number of casualties and emergency services required (including those already at the scene and details of personnel required).

METHANE is used for major incidents. Where an incident falls below the threshold for a major incident, the model becomes ETHANE. It is recommended that this format is used for all incidents and be updated as the incident develops.

If necessary, control room supervisors should prompt initial responders to report in a structured manner using METHANE as a template and ensure that regular METHANE updates are obtained. All relevant information should be shared with responding agencies as appropriate.

**Read more about the METHANE model on the JESIP website.**



## Joint decision model

The **joint decision model (JDM)** is based on the police **national decision model (NDM)**. When commanders arrive at the scene of a major incident, it is essential that they can quickly establish what is happening around them and jointly agree a plan of action.



The model guides the decision-making process. The aim of the response is to save lives and reduce harm. This is at the centre of the model, as it applies at all stages. The other stages of the model aim to guide decision-makers to choose the most appropriate actions to save lives and reduce harm, in a structured and logical way. The stages are:

- gathering and sharing information and intelligence
- assess threats and risks and develop a working strategy
- consideration of powers, policies and procedures
- identifying options and contingencies
- taking actions and reviewing consequences

The JDM also recognises the need for emerging information and intelligence to feed into the model, using these steps to ensure actions and outcomes are regularly reviewed.

## Initial responders

On arrival at the scene, initial responders should:

- consider their own personal safety
- not get involved in rescue activities
- consider the **JESIP principles**
- undertake an assessment using the **METHANE** mnemonic as a guide
- declare a **major incident**, if appropriate

- establish rendezvous point(s) for incoming personnel
- establish a forward command post, if safe to do so

## First officer at scene

The initial police responders to a potential emergency or major incident must undertake an assessment which will help to determine the scale and nature of the response. The initial moments of a sudden impact emergency or major incident will, by their very nature, be chaotic and confused. Initial responders may not be able to clearly determine the scale of the incident at this stage. It is important, however, that any assessment undertaken by an initial responder should be as accurate as possible to allow an appropriate response.

The first officer attending the scene of a major incident should consider the following initial actions:

- record time of arrival and provide a situation report to the control room using the **METHANE** mnemonic
- use body-worn video to record decision making
- make a dynamic risk assessment of the scene using the information available
- take interim charge until replaced by a more senior officer
- maintain contact with the control room
- request additional resources if needed
- do not get involved in the rescue activities
- identify forward command post if safe to do so
- identify any victims, casualties or bodies
- protect the scene, safeguard the evidence and isolate the perimeter, with tape if needed
- identify possible witnesses
- identify and arrest suspects (consider cross-contamination)
- commence scene log

The preservation of life is paramount and should be considered above anything else.

It is important that other emergency services attending the scene are briefed and that a joint risk assessment and shared situational awareness is carried out. Where possible, emergency agencies should initially co-locate and communicate with each other at the forward command post.

This allows agencies to:

- undertake and coordinate operational command of resources at the scene
- undertake a joint risk assessment and shared situational awareness
- appoint roles as required requesting further resources as necessary
- activate emergency plans
- set immediate priorities and agree them with other agencies
- consider early tactical response

## Rescue

The priorities in this phase are:

- for the emergency services to rescue casualties and survivors
- to ensure that appropriate medical attention is given as soon as possible

Key actions for this phase may include:

- rescuing all casualties and survivors
- decontaminating casualties and survivors (if required)
- implementing cordon control arrangements
- providing triage, treatment, stabilisation and transportation of casualties to receiving hospitals
- establishing a **survivors reception centre**
- establishing a media reception point
- facilitating access for responding partner agencies
- establishing police documentation teams

For further information go to the Cabinet Office's [\*\*Emergency response and recovery guidance\*\*](#).

## Scene management and cordons


Securing the scene is a primary role of the police in an emergency or major incident.

Responsibilities include:

- setting up a **forward command post**
- creating **cordons**
- controlling the **scene access control point**
- identifying and managing **rendezvous points (RVPs)**

- managing initial traffic issues (this should be passed to the local authority or highways at the earliest opportunity)
- identifying and managing **marshalling areas and strategic holding areas**

Those involved in major incident response should consider the effect such incidents will have on traffic management and development of effective response plans.



## Forward command post

The forward command post (FCP) is the management post for the incident officer (officer in charge at that time) and the central point of contact for all emergency and support services engaged at the scene.

When establishing an FCP, consider the following criteria.

- It should be in a safe location – ascertain all present and potential hazards.
- Ideally, it should be adjacent to the approach route from the **marshalling areas**, with parking for other emergency services command and support vehicles.
- It should be close enough to the scene to maintain control but divorced from actual working teams.
- It should be prominently signed and easy to find (it is recommended that the only blue flashing lights illuminated are those of the emergency services command vehicles).
- It should be secure from the media and any possible terrorist or other criminal activity.

- It should only allow access to commanders and those needed to support decision making.
- Liaise with the fire incident officer to determine the location.

## Cordons

Cordons should be put in place as soon as possible following consultation with the commanders of other emergency services. The fire and rescue service silver commander is able to advise on the extent of the cordons relative to hazards and health and safety.

The purpose of a cordon is to:

- assist in protecting the scene, the public and those working at the scene
- control unauthorised access
- prevent unauthorised interference with the scene
- facilitate emergency services operations
- ensure the integrity of the scene is maintained for any investigation

Cordon distances and staff requirements for specific locations or high-risk areas may be determined in advance and incorporated into plans. These may be adjusted depending on the event. Personnel deployed on cordons must be briefed on their role and ongoing developments.

Resources from other agencies and private contractors can be used to provide cordoning services to police forces. Private contractors have no statutory authority and they have to rely on a police officer at a terrorist-related incident – to exercise any powers.

In the event of other agencies or private contractors being deployed, a risk assessment of the scene must be conducted and the information regarding cordon management requirements should be given to the force incident manager (FIM) and contractor or agency.

### Inner cordon

The inner cordon encloses the scene of an incident and contains any area of hazard or contamination. During the **rescue phase**, the **fire and rescue service** working in cooperation with medical personnel may be responsible for the inner cordon area.

Red-and-white tape designates the inner cordon. The size of the inner cordon is determined by the incident. The normal recommended minimum distances for a bomb scene are:

- 100 metres for a minor explosive risk
- 200 metres for a moderate explosive risk
- 400 metres for a serious explosive risk

Cordons where there may be an explosive or ballistic threat should be out of line of sight and behind hard cover.

If in doubt, cordon off a large area and seek advice from the military explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) experts. Requests for EOD resources should be made to the Joint Services EOD Operations Centre (for which standing ministerial approval also applies).

Details of all personnel entering and exiting an inner cordon must be recorded for forensic reasons and to ensure that everyone can be accounted for in the event of an evacuation.

When the rescue phase is complete, the police have responsibility for the area enclosed within an inner cordon in order to:

- recover the deceased and human remains
- carry out forensic examination of the scene
- collect evidence on behalf of a senior investigating officer (SIO) or senior identification manager (SIM)

#### Outer cordon

The outer cordon creates a safe working area for the emergency services and responding agencies. The radius of the cordoned area depends on the type and scope of the incident, the availability of resources and the needs of the community. The tactical commander determines this in consultation with other emergency services.

An outer cordon is designated by blue-and-white tape, preferably clearly marked with the word 'police'. The scene access control point and exit point must be staffed. Staff must be made aware of who will be arriving, in addition to the emergency services and other specialist and support personnel. People seeking access must be questioned about their identity and why they require access. Within an outer cordon, the use of blue lights should be restricted to ambulances collecting or conveying patients, as well as designated command vehicles.

Personnel staffing the outer cordon must be alert to the possibility of people trying to gain unauthorised access, particularly through more remote sections of the boundary. Briefings should clearly identify who is permitted through which cordons and rendezvous points.

In certain circumstances, other agencies' personnel who have a duty to investigate may require urgent access. For example:

- other investigating bodies such as the [\*\*Air Accidents Investigation Branch \(AAIB\)\*\*](#) or [\*\*Rail Accident Investigation Branch \(RAIB\)\*\*](#). Where a criminal act or investigation occurs, these organisations have a statutory duty to investigate crashworthiness and identify any safety learning
- structural engineers
- local authority building control surveyors
- authorised voluntary sector workers

#### **Traffic cordon**

A traffic cordon needs to be established to restrict vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.

Diversions should be used to divert all non-essential traffic from roads leading to or from the incident to prevent congestion and secure free passage of emergency traffic around the scene.

Wherever possible, a one-way system with defined access and exit routes should be implemented. Emergency routes to and from designated hospitals should be determined in advance.

#### **Scene access control points**

The police service and fire and rescue service should jointly establish and manage access control points for both inner and outer cordons.

Control should be exercised early in an [\*\*emergency\*\*](#) or [\*\*major incident\*\*](#) to ensure that only personnel with a justifiable reason are allowed access.

Generally, there should only be one entry and exit point to the inner cordon, known as the scene access control point. Access through the outer cordon should be via access control points. Providing separate entrance and exit points assists traffic flow in and between cordoned areas.

Staff at the scene access control point are responsible for:

- documenting the details of people entering the inner cordon, the entry and exit times, and the reason for access (documenting access to the outer cordon is unlikely to be necessary)
- preparing the document and audit trail for the retrieval of the deceased and human remains from the scene (records are disclosable and should be made available to the senior investigating officer)

#### Legal issues

Statutory provisions that allow the police to impose and enforce a cordon are contained in the Terrorism Act 2000:

- section 33 defines a cordoned area
- section 34 gives the power to designate a cordoned area
- section 35 explains the duration of a cordon
- section 36 defines the police powers in respect of enforcement of a cordoned area by a constable in uniform

More information is available in the Police Reform Act 2002.

The police are justified in cordoning off an area for the following reasons:

- to protect public safety
- to prevent an actual or anticipated breach of the peace
- to protect a crime scene
- at the request, and with the consent of, the landowner

Any person failing to comply with the directions of a police officer deployed to enforce a cordon may be committing an offence under section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996, namely resisting or wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of their duty. The powers of arrest under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 apply where appropriate. Firefighters also have some legal powers under section 44 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 that may be useful in an emergency or major incident.

#### Traffic management

An emergency or major incident is likely to have an impact on transport networks, especially road and rail. Traffic management can, therefore, be pre-identified as an operational specialist function and activated at any incident where traffic management is required.

Traffic management includes establishing:

- **rendezvous points**
- traffic control
- **marshalling areas** (strategic holding areas and tactical holding areas)
- diversions
- communication with the public

Information on traffic diversions should be passed to the media for public broadcast. Local authorities, **National Highways** (or devolved equivalents) and motoring organisations may be able to assist with suitable signage.

Free passage of emergency traffic to and from the site is essential. Wherever possible, a one-way system with defined access and exit routes should be implemented to avoid congestion in the area surrounding the scene. Emergency routes to and from designated hospitals should be determined in advance.

#### **Rendezvous point (RVP)**

The RVP is a location to which all police and emergency services personnel attending an incident should be directed. This ensures that the scene of the incident does not become inundated with resources, and that personnel can be deployed in an orderly fashion. A designated RVP should be a location suitable for marshalling, briefing and deploying resources. An RVP manager should be appointed to coordinate the RVP and these resources.

The type and number of emergency resources that are to be deployed and used during an incident depends on the nature of the event. It is likely to include a range of emergency resources, responders and other agencies. It is, therefore, important that partners are involved in identifying potential locations. This ensures that resources from the police and other agencies are not competing for limited space. It may be appropriate for the fire and rescue service and ambulance service to have different RVPs.

Where there is one RVP, the police are responsible for the logging and deployment of other specialist and voluntary services attending (with the exception of the fire and rescue service and the ambulance service). All personnel attending the scene should be directed to the RVP.

The location of an RVP should be secure and safe for emergency services personnel to use and it should be searched prior to use. If an RVP is being established in response to a suspected terrorist incident, it is preferable that it is not in an obvious, predetermined location.

When identifying an area and establishing an RVP, it is important to consider:

- safety and security of vehicles left there
- space needed to accommodate all responding organisations
- suitable hardstanding for vehicles
- adequate lighting
- access for large vehicles
- how easy the location is to find
- accommodation available for the personnel deployed there
- safety and security of vehicles left there
- location in relation to the marshalling area on the outer cordon

### **Marshalling areas**

A marshalling area, suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles, should be identified to hold resources not immediately required at the scene. Liaison officers should be available at the marshalling areas. Vehicles should not be allowed to remain at the incident site unnecessarily.

Although RVPs can provide an impromptu area, a number of other locations may have been predetermined by forces and are commonly referred to as tactical holding areas (THAs). If the incident is of a large scale, strategic holding areas (SHAs) may also be required.

The terms tactical holding area (THA) and strategic holding area (SHA) are normally only used in relation to a police national public order mobilisation plan (PNPOMP) event. The predesignated THAs and SHAs may be used as marshalling areas in response to a major incident, depending upon the location of the incident. Consider providing a safe area for helicopters to use, adjacent to a marshalling area.

**Tactical holding area**

This is the location where staff receive tactical briefings prior to being operationally deployed in an incident. It may also be the location in which personnel and equipment are held on standby if they are not required immediately. The tactical holding area (THA) is for holding resources once they have been assigned to a tactical commander.

A THA manager should be appointed to:

- supervise the THA
- maintain a log of incoming police resources
- inform the forward command post and the tactical control of their availability
- brief incoming officers attending the scene
- direct resources to a marshalling area until deployed to the scene

**Strategic holding area**

A strategic holding area (SHA) is a location providing sufficient staff and facilities for the reception and coordination of mutual aid and other supporting resources at major incidents. It may be required to accommodate any combination of the three main emergency services and partner agencies, depending on the nature and type of incident. An SHA is normally identified beforehand and is able to provide sufficient space to allow command support and operational logistics capabilities to operate across four functional areas:

- communications
- capabilities and resources
- logistical support
- welfare

At this location, staff are given a strategic overview of the event they are attending. If necessary, police public order resources may be brigaded into larger units such as a basic mobilisation unit (BMU).

The requirement for an SHA is based on various factors that include the:

- nature and complexity of the incident

- time required to return to normality
- size of the incident
- location of the incident, including whether the incident is made up of a number of smaller incidents
- quantity and size of likely resources to deal with the incident – in a terrorism incident, any identified RVP, THA and SHA should be searched prior to use in case of secondary incidents

More information is available in the APP on **Mobilisation**.

#### **Traffic control**

A multi-agency approach is essential for the effective coordination of a managed traffic control response. Key individuals within the transport sector should be identified at the earliest opportunity. They assist with the development and implementation of a robust plan that maintains the operational efficiency of the road and transport networks. Measures to implement cordons, road closures or diversions in the first instance fall within the statutory powers of the police. Additional support is provided by the local authority or other agencies to reinforce measures once a plan has been agreed. A local authority traffic manager (a requirement under the provisions of the Traffic Management Act 2004) can provide an overview of the road network. The RVP manager, police operational traffic commander and local authority traffic manager consult closely to:

- identify and maintain the integrity of emergency service routes, taking implemented cordons into account
- maintain access to and from **marshalling areas**
- ensure priority and diversionary routes are accessible
- ensure that all non-essential traffic is diverted away from the incident

#### **National Highways**

**National Highways** is an executive agency of the Department for Transport. It is responsible for operating, maintaining and improving the strategic road network in England. Most motorways and some all-purpose trunk roads are part of the strategic road network and the responsibility of National Highways. All other public roads are the responsibility of local authority highway departments. National Highways' primary responsibilities are:

- implementing emergency road closures

- maintaining and improving traffic movement
- removing obstructions

The joint operational aims for the police and National Highways can be summarised as:

- improving road safety
- reducing incident-related congestion
- freeing up police resources

National Highways has regional control centres that coordinate its operational resources, and it is the primary contact in the event of an emergency or major incident.

## **Media briefing centre**

To assist with managing the media, a media briefing centre (MBC) should be set up and regular briefings should be arranged. Initially, consider establishing the MBC at or near the scene to control media attendance and provide a single point of contact. A full MBC can normally be established adjacent to the strategic command centre.

The nominated media spokesperson should talk for all the agencies and convey messages agreed by the SCG. The MBC should be staffed by appropriately trained media liaison staff from all organisations and have communications and conference facilities.

It will be the main contact and source of information for the media and for briefing media liaison officers (MLOs) from partner agencies.

## **Casualty clearing station**

A casualty clearing station (CCS) is a temporary structure or building established between the inner and outer cordons. An advanced paramedic takes the role of casualty clearing clinical lead. As more resources arrive on scene, it is vital that patient documentation starts within the CCS.

### **Triaging casualties**

The priority of casualties is initially assessed while at the scene. This assessment is then reviewed at the CCS and casualties are further triaged.

Casualties are triaged into three distinct categories.

- Priority 1 (P1) – casualties requiring immediate life-saving resuscitation and/or surgery.
- Priority 2 (P2) – stabilised casualties needing early surgery, but delay is acceptable.
- Priority 3 (P3) – casualties requiring treatment, but a longer delay is acceptable (walking wounded).

Those categorised as P1 and P2 at the scene are transported to the CCS for further prioritisation and/or treatment and transfer to designated hospitals.

Those categorised as P3 are directed to the CCS or the designated P3 area for further triaging and/or treatment.

Those categorised as ‘uninjured’ should be directed to the survivor reception centre (SuRC) for identification by the police. Those categorised as dead should be identified with a completed ‘DEAD’ triage card. They should be left in-situ for later identification and/or investigation by the police and coroner. Dead patients can be moved if access is required to living casualties, but any movement must be documented and communicated to the police and HM Coroner.

## Retrieval and investigation

In most cases where a major incident occurs, a police investigation commences to establish whether any crimes have been committed and, if so, by whom. Further information on major investigations is available in the [\*\*Major investigations and public protection APP\*\*](#).

Key actions for this phase may include:

- early integration within the existing scene command structure to ensure shared situational awareness
- implementing the forensic strategy for the scene, which is provided by the senior investigating officer in consultation with the senior identification manager
- recovering deceased people and human remains in accordance with [\*\*disaster victim identification\*\*](#) (DVI) principles
- establishing a victim audit area (VAA) or areas, as required
- retrieving personal effects
- securing and retrieving evidence from the scene
- ensuring involvement of key personnel, such as the [\*\*coroner\*\*](#)
- compiling an ongoing [\*\*community impact assessment\*\*](#)

- preparing for the handover of lead coordinating agency responsibility

## Role of the police in major incident investigations

If it is clear that criminality is the cause of the incident, the police lead any investigations. Support may be required from specialist investigators from other agencies.

Where the cause is not immediately identifiable, the police follow standard procedures to preserve continuity of evidence. If there is no criminal activity, this assists industry-specific investigators when they arrive on the scene. Officers on the scene should follow the [\*\*investigative golden hour principles\*\*](#).

The police may be asked to assist with investigations carried out by specialists.

## Role of the coroner

Where a fatality occurs in England and Wales, the coroner in whose jurisdiction the body lies takes possession of the body.

No activity, including movement of the body, can occur without the authority of the coroner.

In the event of a mass fatality incident – or an incident resulting in deaths over several jurisdictions from the same or similar causes – the chief coroner can appoint a single lead coroner for the coronial investigation.

The police service will work on behalf and in support of coronial services to recover and identify the deceased. Further information on this can be found in [\*\*Disaster victim identification \(DVI\) APP\*\*](#).

## Counter terrorism policing

The response to a terrorist incident follows the same principles as the response to other types of major incident. This includes:

- assessing and communicating a situation report (through METHANE)
- multi-agency working (through JESIP)
- the establishment of appropriate command and control

If there is any indication that an incident may be linked to terrorism, responding officers and staff should follow 'stay safe' guidance (available from [College Learn](#) – you will need to log in). This guidance applies to:

- any marauding attack (involving, or potentially involving, firearms or other lethal weapons)
- response to improvised explosive devices (IED)

Forces are supported by a counter terrorism policing network. This network can provide specialist capabilities at a national and regional level to support the response (and ongoing activity, such as investigation) to a terrorist incident. Emergency and contingency planners in force should liaise with their regional protect and prepare hubs. This ensures that counter terrorism-related command and control protocols (for example, Operation Plato) are integrated into their major incident plans. It also ensures these are rehearsed (for example, through exercising) with other responding agencies.

In the event of a terrorist incident affecting British citizens at home or overseas, the [victims of terrorism unit \(VTU\)](#) coordinates action at a government level, to support them.

## Other investigating bodies

The police may be asked to assist with investigations carried out by specialists.

### Accident Investigation Branches (AIBs)

The [Rail Accident Investigation Branch \(RAIB\)](#), [Air Accidents Investigations Branch \(AAIB\)](#) and the [Marine Accidents Investigation Branch \(MAIB\)](#) are all accident investigation branches that are part of the [Department for Transport](#). They are the UK's independent bodies for investigating accidents and incidents that take place in Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

They are not prosecuting bodies and they do not apportion blame or liability. Investigations focus solely on improving safety. Breaches of legislation are dealt with by other organisations, usually the police and safety authorities. These organisations aim to improve safety by:

- carrying out investigations to determine the causes and circumstances of railway, civil aircraft and marine accidents and incidents
- identifying any other factors that contributed to the event or made the outcome worse
- publishing investigation reports containing details of the investigation
- making evidence-based safety recommendations to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence

- increasing awareness of how accidents happen through effective liaison and discussion and by disseminating intelligence from investigation initiatives
- improving national and international cooperation in accident investigations

The AIBs have a [\*\*memorandum of understanding \(MoU\) with the Chief Coroner for England and Wales.\*\*](#)

## **Ministry of Defence**

The Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) is part of the Defence Safety Authority (DSA). The DAIB is a multimodal organisation responsible for conducting Ministry of Defence (MoD) safety-related investigations across air, land and sea.

Following an incident that requires the DAIB to investigate, a DAIB-led triage team conducts the initial analysis. After this, the DSA's director general decides on the depth of further investigation. The highest statutory level of defence inquiry is known as a service inquiry and is led by a panel of three MoD personnel. Below this level, non-statutory inquiries can be conducted by either the DAIB or service commands.

DAIB investigations seek to:

- determine the cause of an accident
- identify the accident factors
- make a series of safety recommendations

DAIB safety investigations do not apportion blame or liability but aim to prevent recurrence and reduce future safety incidents.

For air-related accidents, a regionally based Royal Air Force liaison officer attends the scene and represents the MoD at any strategic commanders' meetings. Sometimes, the AAIB may also investigate accidents involving military aircraft with the DAIB – see [\*\*The Civil Aviation \(Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents\) Regulations 2018\*\*](#), and vice versa.

## **Health and Safety Executive**

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) aims to reduce work-related death, injury and ill health. Its activities include investigating incidents, enquiring into citizens' complaints and enforcing the law.

HSE prosecutes both companies and individuals for breaches of health and safety law. The HSE and police may conduct a joint investigation. Primacy may shift between the two as the investigation proceeds.

For further information go to [\*\*Health and Safety Executive.\*\*](#)

## Tags

Civil emergencies